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THE SIXTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT THE
FIRST AMENDMENT PROVIDES A LIMITED
RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO
DEPORTATION HEARINGS-DETROIT
FREE PRESS V. ASHCROFT
William Taylor*
EMOCRACIES die behind closed doors .... When gov-
ernment begins closing doors, it selectively controls infor-
mation rightfully belonging to the people. Selective
information is misinformation."' Although these words from the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft are both powerful and
poetic, they are not necessarily correct. The government routinely closes
many doors and selectively disseminates much information without en-
dangering the life of our democracy. 2 Nevertheless, by holding that the
First Amendment conveys a limited right of public access to deportation
hearings, the Sixth Circuit propped open a door that is essential to the
functioning of American democracy. A contrary holding would have re-
moved the right of access to virtually all administrative hearings, which
would have devastating effects far beyond immigration law.
Under the authorization of Attorney General John Ashcroft, the Of-
fice of the Chief Immigration Judge designates certain cases to be "spe-
cial interest cases." 3 On September 21, 2002, Chief Immigration Judge
Michael Creppy issued a directive (Creppy directive) to all Immigration
Judges requiring that all such cases be closed to the press and the public,
including family members and friends of deportees. 4
On December 19, 2002, Immigration Judge Elizabeth Hacker con-
ducted a bond hearing for Rabih Haddad, who was subject to deportation
for overstaying his visa.5 The government suspected that an Islamic char-
ity operated by Haddad supplied funds to terrorist groups, and Haddad's
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
1. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
2. See, e.g., Michael Kelly, Secrecy, Case By Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2002, at A23
(noting that schools and courts select information for students and jurors, respectively, that
the President's national security briefings are held behind "those democracy-killing closed
doors," and that court proceedings involving national security are frequently not open to
the public at large).
3. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683.
4. Id. at 683-84.
5. Id. at 684.
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case was designated a special interest case.6 Haddad's family, members
of the public, Congressman John Conyers, and several newspapers sought
to attend the deportation hearing. 7 On the day of the hearing-without
prior notice to the public, Haddad, or his attorney-security officers an-
nounced that the hearing was closed to the public and the press. 8 Subse-
quent hearings were also closed.9
Several newspapers, in addition to joining Haddad and Congressman
Conyers in filing other claims, sought (1) a declaratory judgment from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan that the
Creppy directive violated their First Amendment right of access to Had-
dad's deportation proceedings, (2) an injunction against subsequent clo-
sure of proceedings in Haddad's case, and (3) a release of all transcripts
and documents from previous proceedings.' 0 The district court granted
the newspapers' motion, finding that the newspapers had a First Amend-
ment right of access to deportation hearings. I The government filed an
appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals; in the interim, the Sixth
Circuit granted a temporary stay of the district court's order.' 2 The Sixth
Circuit then dissolved the temporary stay and denied the government's
motion for a stay pending appeal. 13
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court's
injunction.1 4 Writing for the court, Judge Keith first decided that the
Creppy directive involved non-substantive' 5 immigration law and did not
require special deference to the government.' 6 Although the government
has plenary power over substantive immigration issues, 17 political discre-
tion over non-substantive issues is limited if a fundamental right is impli-
cated.' 8 The court then held that the First Amendment conveyed a
limited right of access to deportation hearings under the two-part "expe-







12. Id. at 685.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 711.
15. "The difference between substantive and non-substantive immigration law is that
substantive immigration law answers the questions, 'who is allowed entry' or 'who can be
deported.'" Id. at 686 n.6.
16. Id. at 685-93.
17. See, e.g., Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (holding there is no First
Amendment bar to excluding people because of their beliefs): Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (holding that courts cannot limit Congress from expelling
"aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable as citizens").
18. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 693; see, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695
(2001) (noting that the plenary power was "subject to important constitutional limita-
tions"); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) (noting that Congress has plenary
authority where it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, "so long as the exercise of that
authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction").
19. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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progeny.20 Finally, since a limited right of access existed, the court held
that the government failed to show that its denial of access was narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling state interest. 21 The Creppy directive failed
to require specific findings, on the record, so that a reviewing court could
determine whether closure was appropriate. 22 Furthermore, the Creppy
directive was both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. 23 The court did not
hold that deportation hearings must remain open, but that closure on a
case-by-case basis, as required prior to the Creppy directive, would be a
less restrictive means of achieving the government's desired ends. 24
In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court held that there is a First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials.25 Justice Brennan, in a con-
curring opinion later adopted by the Court,26 set forth the two-part "ex-
perience and logic" test to determine if a fundamental right of access
exists. 27 Under the "experience" prong, the Court looks at "whether the
place and process have traditionally been open to the press and general
public."' 28 The "logic" prong addresses whether public access plays a
"significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question. '29 If these prongs are met, then a qualified First Amendment
right of access attaches. This right can only be overcome by a showing
that closure is narrowly tailored to achieve an overriding interest, based
on findings specific enough for a reviewing court to determine if closure
was appropriate. 30 Using the "experience and logic" test, the Supreme
Court has since extended the right of access to include aspects of criminal
cases outside of the trial phase. 3'
Other courts have also applied the "logic and experience" test outside
of the criminal context. Although the Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed the issue of whether there is a First Amendment right to attend
civil proceedings, several circuit courts (including the Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh) have addressed the
issue.32 All have agreed that the governing test is the two-part Richmond
Newspapers test and that the press and public have a First Amendment
right to attend civil proceedings. 33
20. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 694-96.
21. Id. at 705-10.
22. Id. at 707.
23. Id. at 710.
24. See id. at 707-10.
25. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580.
26. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (adopting Justice
Brennan's test) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise II].
27. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558.
28. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 8.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 9.
31. See id. at 13 (holding that a limited right of access existed with regard to prelimi-
nary hearings); Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 501-04 (1984) (holding
that the limited right of access existed with regard to voir dire and jury selection) [hereinaf-
ter Press-Enterprise I].




In addition to its application in civil trials, the "logic and experience"
test has been applied to administrative hearings. The Sixth Circuit previ-
ously applied the test to determine if there was a right of access to a
university's student disciplinary board proceedings.34 The court held that
there was no right of access; however, the decision was based on the fact
that disciplinary proceedings are often not conducted in accordance with
cherished judicial principles, with key elements being that the proceed-
ings did not "afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses . . ., or to call his own witness to verify
his version of the incident. ' 35 Likewise, the Third Circuit used the "expe-
rience and logic" test to find a right of access to municipal planning com-
mission meetings.36
The Sixth Circuit was correct in using the "experience and logic" test to
determine whether the right of access applies to deportation hearings for
several reasons. First, although Justice O'Connor has said in a concurring
opinion that Richmond Newspapers does not have any implication be-
yond criminal trials,37 the Supreme Court has since applied the "experi-
ence and logic" test to additional proceedings beyond the traditional
trial.38 Likewise, every circuit court to address the issue has applied this
test to civil trials as well as criminal. 39 Furthermore, recent, unrelated
Supreme Court cases have inquired into the substance of administrative
proceedings and their adjudicative characteristics rather than simply dis-
posing of the cases by determining that the proceedings were administra-
tive.40 Deportation hearings, like the proceedings in Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, "walk, talk, and
squawk" like a trial.41 Most importantly, Sixth Circuit precedent has con-
clusively established that the "experience and logic" test applies not only
to criminal trials, but to civil trials and administrative hearings as well.42
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit was correct in its conclusion that deporta-
tion hearings meet the "experience and logic" test. Deportation hearings
have been presumptively open by statute since 1965. 43 Furthermore,
since 1893, only eleven years after the enactment of the first general im-
34. United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2002).
35. Id. at 822.
36. Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999).
37. Compare Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 611 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the "experience and logic" test is limited to crimi-
nal trials), with Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (arguing that a right of access applies to both civil and criminal trials).
38. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise H1, 478 U.S. at 7-10.
39. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 695 n.1l.
40. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) (concluding that social security proceedings
were inquisitorial rather than adversarial); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth.,
122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (noting that Federal Maritime Commission proceedings "walk[ed],
talk[ed], and squawk[ed] very much like ... lawsuits).
41. For an in-depth discussion of the quasi-judicial aspects of deportation hearings, see
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696-700.
42. See Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 824; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710
F.2d 1165, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1983).
43. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (2002).
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migration act, Congress has required that exclusion hearings (which de-
termine whether an alien can be admitted into the country) be held
"separate and apart from the public," while making no mention of requir-
ing that deportation hearings (determining if an alien should be removed
form the country) be closed.44 In fact, even deportation hearings in a re-
cently created anti-terrorism court are presumptively open to the pub-
lic. 45 In contrast to the government's argument that the "experience" test
should be judged against the tradition of the common law, the Supreme
Court and circuit courts have looked to more recent history as well.46
Furthermore, common law history does not provide guidance, since for-
malized administrative adjudications were all but unheard of in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and "[t]he Framers ...could not
have anticipated the vast growth of the administrative state. '47 Thus, for
the relevant time period since 1893, deportation hearings have been open
to the public and meet the test of "experience."
With regard to "logic," the court's reasons why openness benefits de-
portation-which included (1) providing a check on Executive power and
(2) ensuring that the individual citizen can participate in and contribute
to our republican form of government-do not appear to be seriously
challenged by the government. Therefore, the "experience and logic" test
was correctly applied by the court.
The significance of the Sixth Circuit's decision goes far beyond the
scope of deportation hearings. The Creppy directive, even if allowed to
stand, was but a small, incremental assault on the individual liberties
guaranteed to each person by the Constitution. In contrast, the govern-
ment's argument that a First Amendment right of access never applies to
administrative hearings, if accepted, would have had a disastrous effect
on both the liberty interests protected by the Constitution and the separa-
tion of powers that provides the greatest check against abuse of power.
With the increase in administrative regulation over the past century, vir-
tually all areas of American life are governed by administrative agencies.
Without at least a limited right of access to administrative proceedings,
large sections of the government could operate in virtual secrecy. Fur-
thermore, since many proceedings have limited rights of appeal, public
scrutiny may be the only check on potential abuses by these agencies.
Finally, "[d]rawing sharp lines between administrative and judicial pro-
ceedings would allow the legislature to artfully craft information out of
the public eye."'48 Although placing adjudication into an administrative
proceeding rather than a court will not circumvent the Eleventh Amend-
44. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701.
45. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-35 (1999).
46. See Press-Enterprise I1, 478 U.S. at 10-12 (looking exclusively at post-Bill of Rights
history); NBC v. Presser, 828 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding a First Amendment
right of access while reviewing history from 1924 to 1984).
47. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1872.
48. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696.
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ment,4 9 the absence of a right of access to administrative hearings would
be an invitation to circumvent the First Amendment by just such a
method.
Likewise, the government's argument that deportation hearings lack
the required tradition to meet the "experience and logic" test would have
an equally disastrous effect on fundamental liberty. If the First Amend-
ment does not convey a right of access on deportation hearings-which
have a century-old tradition of openness, have many of the hallmarks of
judicial proceedings but lack some of the protections, and which affect
the very physical liberty of their subjects-then what administrative pro-
ceedings does it protect? Such a decision would amount to a de facto
rejection of the right to public access, with the First Amendment convey-
ing a theoretical right of access to administrative hearings that would
never be applied in practice. The results of such a scenario would be just
as devastating to personal liberty as an outright rejection of the right of
access to administrative proceedings.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court may have to decide how far the right of
public access extends, perhaps sooner rather than later. 50 In doing so, the
Court should follow the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit to avoid a cata-
strophic reduction of the right of public scrutiny. While democracies do
not necessarily die behind closed doors, the loss of public access to ad-
ministrative hearings would result in the death of public oversight of the
government as we know it.
49. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1869-70.
50. During oral arguments concerning the appeal of an almost identical case, N. Jersey
Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002), Judge Becker of the
Third Circuit is quoted as saying "I understand that this case is headed to a higher court,
but we are bound by 3rd Circuit precedent." Shannon P. Duffy, Arguments Made on De-
portation Hearing Regs, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 18, 2002, at 1.
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